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CA1 Online-Only Material: Supplement A

Variability in men’s reproductive success (RS) is partly attributable to the ability of successful men to inﬂuence resource
ﬂows relevant to the mate choice and reproduction of women.
This study explores the effects of variability in resource ﬂows
on men’s RS in an indigenous foraging/mixed-economy community in northern Siberia where monogamous marriage
norms predominate. A series of material, embodied, and relational wealth indicators are tested as predictors of men’s
age-adjusted RS and age at ﬁrst birth. Material wealth related
to hunting, embodied wealth as represented by hunting skill,
and relational wealth as represented by numbers of kin are
the most consistent predictors of men’s RS. In this monogamous population, the wives of men with more hunting capital
and of men rated as better hunters have shorter interbirth
intervals, and hunters show strong producer priority. These
ﬁndings and ethnographic observations appear more consistent with a provisioning model than with a signaling-formates model.

Across human populations, a man’s ability to procure, secure, control, or draw upon resources has been shown to
inﬂuence his reproductive success (RS; Nettle and Pollet
2008). Variability in men’s RS has been shown to vary with
military prowess (Chagnon 1979, 1988), political power (Hill
and Hurtado 1996; Betzig 1997), economic success (Irons
1979), hunting ability (Smith 2004), alloparenting (Hill and
Hurtado 1996; Sear and Mace 2008), and wealth (Borgerhoff
Mulder and Beheim 2011; von Rueden et al. 2011). Initial
q 2016 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.
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studies of the relationship between wealth or status and fertility in controlled-fertility populations suggested no relationship or a negative relationship (Vining 1986; Pérusse 1993).
However, more recent studies have demonstrated a positive
relationship for men but not women in Western populations,
largely due to higher rates of childlessness among poorer and
lower-status men (Hopcroft 2006, 2015; Weeden et al. 2006;
Barthold et al. 2012).
The research contributes to the literature on wealth and
reproduction and to debates on men’s productive and reproductive goals. We take a multivariate approach to these
questions using empirical data from an indigenous Siberian
community. The signiﬁcance of this work links to understanding the effects of socioecological context on men’s productive and reproductive goals. This study corroborates studies that have identiﬁed multiple pathways by which wealth
affects male RS in foraging and horticultural societies, speciﬁcally hunting skill, material wealth, and support from kin
(von Rueden et al. 2011, 2015; Wood and Marlowe 2013).
Recent studies on inequality in human society divide wealth
into three classes—embodied, material, and relational—to better understand persistent inequality in different types of subsistence systems (Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2009; Bowles et al.
2010). Following Bowles et al. (2010:9), we deﬁne wealth as “an
attribute of the individual that contributes to a ﬂow of valued goods or services,” which then can be leveraged to increase RS, acknowledging that types of wealth pursued may
vary across time and ecological circumstances (Shennan 2011).
Embodied wealth is deﬁned as somatic development, skills, and
knowledge, speciﬁcally formal education and hunting skill in
our case. Material wealth is deﬁned as access to physical property and material goods, speciﬁcally access to hunting territories and critical hunting implements and transportation. Relational wealth (social capital) is deﬁned as the number and
quality of social relationships, speciﬁcally, in our case, numbers
of individuals in four types of men’s close relatives and a categorization of men’s occupational networks (occupational
tier). This article investigates how variation within these three
wealth classes is related to the variability in men’s RS in a
monogamous community of majority indigenous people in
the Siberian Arctic. We use these ﬁndings to explore the pathways by which wealth inﬂuences men’s RS in this context.
Smith (2004) argues that the correlation between hunting
success and RS in men may be accounted for by several proximate mechanisms. Smith discusses the evidence for each of
these mechanisms in ﬁve well-documented societies and argues that widespread sharing of game meat within huntergatherer communities weakens the ﬁrst three. There has been
much debate within anthropology on the merits of direct
provisioning versus indirect reciprocity and costly signaling
(Hawkes 1993, 2010; Hill and Kaplan 1993; Gurven and Hill
2009, 2010; Wood and Marlowe 2013), largely hinging on the
degree to which hunters control their results of production.
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The degree to which meat is controlled by producers and their
families in foraging societies is variable, but even where sharing is widespread, producers often keep larger shares than are
distributed to others and are able to direct portions to speciﬁc
other individuals (Gurven 2004).
After examining the effects of a number of variables representing wealth on men’s RS, we address the question of
mechanism and producer control. In 2001 and 2003, J. P.
Ziker documented 77 foraging excursions and subsequent
distributions of the hunters’ portions. An analysis of the 36
hunters’ meat and ﬁsh distributions documented in two ﬁeld
seasons indicates a high level of producer priority over the
catch. Producer priority is a prerequisite for the direct provisioning, dyadic reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity mechanisms by which hunting success inﬂuences male RS. We examine average interbirth intervals of the women with whom
men had children, considering variable skill and the wealth
of their male partners. The results are consistent with the
mechanisms requiring producer priority.
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age is used as a better proxy of RS than total number of
children born. Data on the number of children were extracted from J. P. Ziker’s 1997, 2003, and 2007 residential censuses and genealogies updated through 2007. Censuses were a
complete list of households registered in the community. Finally, 77 foraging excursions were documented in the 2001
and 2003 ﬁeld season with 36 hunters. These hunters participated in a specialized survey that collected information on the
hunt locations, participants, amounts produced, subsequent
distributions, and rationales for those distributions. With this
snapshot, we examine producer control of output using descriptive statistics to validate ethnographic information on food
sharing.

Predictions regarding Wealth and Men’s RS
On the basis of this earlier research on the socioecology of
food production (Ziker 2002; Ziker, Rasmussen, and Nolin
2016), we develop four speciﬁc predictions for the mechanisms by which wealth affects male RS.

Methods
The study community, Ust’-Avam, is situated on the Taimyr
Peninsula in northern central Siberia. Two indigenous ethnic
groups are represented in the community—the Dolgan and
the Nganasan—along with a small minority of ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and other former Soviet nationalities. The
community is approximately 250 km by air from the regional capital, Dudinka, and 400 km by water from the large
industrial city of Noril’sk. Transportation to and from the
cities is expensive and limited (helicopter, barge, and snowmachine). As a result, the community depends in large part
on hunting, ﬁshing, and trapping activities for subsistence
along with supplemental exchange with the larger market.
Approximately 60% of caloric intake (and almost all of the
protein) is derived from local subsistence activities (Ziker
2014). Ziker (2002) describes the increased importance of
the local subsistence economy after the collapse of the Soviet
planned economy. Ziker (2003) describes the development
of post-Soviet communal property regimes.
J. P. Ziker spent approximately 36 months in the study
community on a series of visits from 1994 through 2007. We
operationalize the three wealth classes using a variety of data
sets that J. P. Ziker developed in Siberia during the 1990s and
2000s. Community censuses, genealogical data, and specialized surveys and observations of hunters provide the data
for the following analyses. Using Poisson regressions with
Akaike information criterion (AIC) selection criteria and backwards stepwise Cox regressions, this report examines the
effects of various forms of wealth on men’s age-adjusted RS
(survival of offspring to 5 years of age) and age at ﬁrst birth
to develop a more robust picture of contributions to male RS
in a northern hunting and gathering community. In populations where infant mortality is high, survival to 5 years of

Prediction 1: Men with Greater Numbers of Consanguineal
Kin Will Have Greater Potential Sources of Nepotism and
Cooperative Childrearing
Greater numbers of kin provide protective effects in many
traditional societies. Network analysis of food distribution
following 77 hunts in Ust’-Avam showed kinship as the statistically most signiﬁcant predictor of interhousehold food
sharing (Ziker, Rasmussen, and Nolin 2016). Controlling for
kinship, the interaction between kinship and reciprocity also
positively predicted food transfers. Previous analysis of food
sharing at meals also showed kinship as the strongest predictor, with reciprocity between households increasing as kinship became closer (Ziker and Schnegg 2005). In food sharing
at meals, this effect was in part due to clustering of highly related households for cooperative childcare.
Prediction 2: Men with Higher Education Levels and Wage
Labor Jobs Will Delay and Curtail Reproduction
Following expectations from embodied capital theory (Lancaster and Kaplan 2010), men will delay reproduction to invest in their own education and careers, will invest in current
offspring rather than add additional offspring, and will prefer
smaller completed family sizes.
Prediction 3: Hunting Skill Leads to Higher RS
Increased hunting skill ratings reﬂect the ability and persistence of men in procuring food. The greater the food production, the more is available for investment in mating effort,
spousal and offspring provisioning, risk-buffering with other
producers, barter and trade outside the community for sup-
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plies and equipment used in hunting, and gifts to others within
the community.
Prediction 4: Greater Hunting Material Capital Leads to
Higher RS
Hunting material capital reﬂects the history of men’s ability
and persistence in procuring food. As above, the greater
the food production, the more is available for investment
in mating effort, spousal and offspring provisioning, riskbuffering with other producers, barter and trade outside the
community for supplies and equipment used in hunting, and
gifts to others within the community.

Dependent Variables
Descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in table A1
(tables A1–A5 available online). We use two dependent variables for this study. The ﬁrst is the number of children
surviving to 5 years of age. We use the number of children
surviving to 5 years of age, rather than the total number
of children born, to provide a better estimate of completed
fertility, taking into consideration survivorship of the very
young. The infant mortality rate in the community was
87∶1,000 in 1996 (Ziker 2002:95), considerably higher than
that for native Siberian peoples on average in the early 1990s
(Vishnevskii 1994:156) and four times higher than that in
Russia on average at that time (United Nations 2013). The
second dependent variable, age at ﬁrst birth (AFB), is the age
of a man at the time of the birth of his ﬁrst child or, for
right-censored cases, his age in 2007 (the latest census) if he
had fathered no children by that time.

Independent Variables
Embodied wealth is a concept that represents past investment or experience and the resulting individual’s capabilities. Rating interviews about men’s hunting skill with nine
key informants in 2003 provide ordinal data on a threepoint scale (1 p poor hunter, 2 p good hunter, 3 p excellent hunter) for 142 living men in the community. Not all
informants provided ratings on all men, which is a problem
discussed below. To represent level of education, we use the
number of years of schooling each man completed as recorded in the village administration census of 2002 and updated with subsequent interviews in 2007.
Material wealth includes assets, income, or other forms of
material resources. We operationalize material wealth related to hunting using a scale consisting of data on four types
of equipment ascertained in key interviews in 2003 and
rights to hunting land holdings in 2003 and 2007, as recognized in the community registry. Minimal equipment is
required for some forms of food production in Ust’-Avam.
Snares can be established with a minimal amount of wire,
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and ﬁshing can be done with a hook and line. Not everyone
in the community owns a riﬂe, snowmobile, or boat motor.
Our material wealth scale represents the variation for the
most committed hunters. We also examine employment and
wage labor listed in 2003 and 2007 community registries as a
dummy variable representing material wealth in the competitive labor market.
Relational wealth is each individual’s network of social
relations. Often thought of as social and political capital,
relational wealth is becoming increasingly important in the
analyses of human behavior, because it structures constraints
and opportunities for individuals (Sear and Mace 2008;
Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2009; Bowles et al. 2010). We operationalize relational wealth using counts of kin, speciﬁcally
the number of living siblings, parents, parents’ siblings, and
parents’ siblings’ offspring. Also, we use men’s historical occupational tier (staff hunter, brigade hunter, amateur, helper,
or nonhunter) in 2003 to operationalize the social relations in which the hunter is embedded in the realm of work.
These tiers reﬂect levels of participation in the Gospromkhoz Taimyrski (government hunting enterprise), with staff
hunters being the most integrated. Staff hunters were listed
in the community registry. Classiﬁcation of other men’s
occupational tier was conducted on the basis of expert interviews in 2003 and 2007.

Scale Reliability
Hunter Skill Evaluations (Embodied Wealth)
A Cronbach’s alpha statistic of 0.825 indicates high interrater reliability of ﬁve of the nine evaluators. These ﬁve provided evaluations of 56 men in common. Not all evaluators
provided ratings on all men, so we use this subsample as a
control against a longer list of men with fewer evaluations.
For missing evaluations, we calculated the mean rating that
an evaluator provided for the men evaluated, and we imputed that mean for the remaining men not rated by that
evaluator. This allows us to use all the ratings provided by
all nine evaluators and to calculate ratings for those men
that were rated by fewer evaluators. This expands the data
set of rated men from 56 to 142 men. In the larger data set,
there are 1,278 total evaluations of which 494 are imputed.
A second Cronbach’s alpha statistic of 0.724 indicates the
interrater reliability remains good. Analysis of the hunter
skill ratings of the subsample of 56 men resulted in higher
coefﬁcients in the Poisson regressions on men’s RS and Cox
regressions of age at ﬁrst birth compared with the set of
142 ratings (tables A2, A3). This indicates possible downward bias in coefﬁcient estimates due to the measurement
error introduced by imputation in the larger sample of 142
men employed below. Furthermore, because of high annual
variation in hunting returns documented among huntergatherers, Hill and Kintigh (2009) suggest that evaluations of
men’s hunting skill by other community members may be
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more reliable than observed hunting returns from a single ﬁeld
season.

15 years of age as a cutoff point because that was the age of the
youngest father in the data set.

Hunter Wealth (Material)

Poisson Regressions

Four types of equipment are inventoried in J. P. Ziker’s 2003
interviews: (1) snowmobile, (2) boat motor, (3) riﬂe, and
(4) shotgun. These capital equipment items, plus a dummy
variable representing (5) occupation of hunting territories,
were evaluated using the mokken package (van der Ark 2013)
in R, version 3.0.0 (R Core Team 2013). Mokken scaling
(Mokken 1971) is a probabilistic, nonparametric method of
unidimensional scale construction similar to Guttman scaling. The resulting hunter material wealth scale (0 to 5) has
a Lovinger’s H p 0:672 (P p :048), indicating strong scalability of these ﬁve items (Lovinger 1948). Wage labor from
the 2007 census is analyzed separately, because it is not correlated to hunting assets in Ust’-Avam (biserial correlation
coefﬁcient rb p 0:049; P p :42).

Of the two embodied wealth variables, hunter skill ratings
are highly signiﬁcant and moderate predictors of men’s RS,
adjusted for age, whereas level of education is a virtually ﬂat
and statistically insigniﬁcant predictor. Education may have
this relationship for two reasons: (1) little variation in educational level for men who ﬁnished schooling during the existence of the Soviet Union, particularly for those men born
during the 1950s through the 1980s; (2) completion of high
school education is not a prerequisite to learning the skills
necessary for hunting, and it may in fact detract from those
skills (UNESCO 2009; Reyes-Garcia et al. 2010). The material wealth scale is also a highly signiﬁcant predictor of ageadjusted RS, whereas a wage labor dummy variable was poorly
predictive and insigniﬁcant. Occupational tier is a signiﬁcant
positive predictor of men’s RS, and only one of the four categories of kin, full ﬁrst cousins, is a statistically signiﬁcant
negative predictor of men’s RS.
A one-unit increase in hunter skill results in exp(0:088) p
1:09 times the number of children predicted by age alone
(table 1). The material wealth scale result indicates a one-unit
increase in wealth results in exp(0:143) p 1:15 times the number of children predicted for their age. Occupational tier has a
similar effect, with a one-unit increase increasing the number
of children exp(0:162) p 1:18 times. The number of ﬁrst full
cousins reduces the expected number of children by 5.9% (exp
(20.61)) with every additional cousin.

Results: Variables Individually Entered
We examine the number of men’s offspring surviving to 5 years
of age (male RS) and AFB entering independent variables
separately in Poisson and Cox regressions (respectively) to determine which independent variables are candidates for multiple regression models. Poisson regressions on RS were performed in R (R Core Team 2013). Cox’s proportional hazards
regressions of AFB were performed in IBM SPSS, version 20.0.0
(IBM 2011). Because of nonindependence of cases, we use a
bootstrap procedure to estimate robust standard errors. The
results for Poisson regressions of men’s RS, controlling for age,
are provided in table 1, and results for AFB are provided in
table 2. We control for age in the Poisson regressions by entering risk-years and risk-years squared into each regression.
Risk-years is the number of years after 15 years of age. We set

Cox Regressions
In predicting AFB, the hunter skill evaluations and level of
education are both signiﬁcant embodied wealth variables

Table 1. Poisson regression of mens’ reproductive success on wealth covariates
Individual covariate
Embodied wealth:
Hunter skill rating
Education
Material wealth:
Hunter wealth scale
Wage labor (dummy)
Relational wealth:
No. of living siblings
No. of parents
No. of parents’ siblings
No. of full ﬁrst cousins
Occupational tier

No. of subjects

Unstandardized coefﬁcient

SE

z-value

P

142
240

.088
.039

.025
.037

3.568
1.072

.000***
.284

272
272

.143
.210

.035
.154

4.034
1.362

.000***
.173

272
272
272
272
272

.004
2.062
2.139
2.061
.162

.041
.150
.089
.021
.039

.107
2.415
21.545
22.951
4.136

.915
.678
.122
.003**
.000***

Note. Risk-years (years since age 15 years) and risk-years2 are entered with each covariate to control for age. Z-test
of signiﬁcance. SE p standard error.
** P ! .01.
*** P ! .001.
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Table 2. Cox regression of the hazard of a man’s ﬁrst child’s birth (15 years of age or older)
Individual covariate
Embodied wealth:
Hunter skill rating
Education
Material wealth:
Hunter wealth scale
Wage labor (dummy)
Relational wealth:
No. of living siblings
No. of parents
No. of parents’ siblings
No. of full ﬁrst cousins
Occupational tier

No. of subjects

b

SE

Exp(b)

P

142
240

.088
.101

.036
.050

1.091
1.106

.010**
.024*

272
272

.138
.548

.048
.223

1.148
1.731

.005**
.016*

272
272
272
272
272

2.089
.059
2.027
2.023
.139

.053
.150
.081
.021
.058

.915
1.061
.973
.977
1.150

.082
.665
.706
.237
.017*

Note. Robust bootstrapped standard errors, 2-tailed signiﬁcance.
* P ! .05.
** P ! .01.

(table 2). A unit increase in hunter skill increases the hazard
of having a ﬁrst child by 1.091. A year increase in education
increases the hazard of having a ﬁrst child by 1.106. Of material wealth variables, the wealth scale and wage labor participation variables were both signiﬁcant predictors of AFB.
A unit increase in material wealth increases the hazard of having a ﬁrst child by 1.148. Participation in wage labor increases
the hazard by 1.731. The only signiﬁcant relational wealth variable is occupational tier, which increases the hazard of having
a ﬁrst child by 1.150. When entered individually, our kin-based
relational wealth measures are not signiﬁcant predictors of AFB.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of hunter skill on age at ﬁrst
birth and the proportion of men who have had a child. The
ﬁgure divides men into three groups by hunter skill evaluation: those within one standard deviation of average evaluation, and those greater or less than one standard deviation
from average evaluation. Most of the men in the group with
the highest scores are fathers by 35 years of age, whereas
roughly 60% of men in the middle category and 50% of men
in the lowest category are fathers by this age.

and risk-years squared) alone; together with these age controls, the model explains 40.8%. Hunter skill ratings, education, wage labor (dummy), occupational tier, men’s parents,
and number of siblings all dropped out of the best-reduced
model. Independent of age, the ﬁnal model shows the importance of relational wealth and material wealth related to
hunting in explaining variance in male RS. The number of
a man’s parent’s siblings have a signiﬁcant positive effect,
whereas ﬁrst cousins have a weaker and negative effect. Although this seems like a small amount of variance explained
by wealth factors, a few points should be taken into consideration. This study occurred over a very volatile time period
with drastic economic changes and corresponding effects on
fertility. These changes are likely introducing temporal effects
disrupting the relationship between wealth and RS over this
period and introducing additional variance. In addition, the
hunter skill rating and material wealth measures are snap-

Results: Best-Reduced Models
We ran all possible subsets of independent variables in Poisson regressions on male RS and identiﬁed the best-ﬁtting
model by AIC. We similarly entered the full set of variables
in a backwards-stepwise Cox regression to identify the bestreduced model of men’s age at ﬁrst birth.

Male RS
Three wealth variables remain in the ﬁnal model of men’s
RS: hunter material wealth, number of parent’s siblings, and
number of full ﬁrst cousins (table 3). The best-reduced
model explains 6.4% of the variance in men’s RS (McFadden
Pseudo-R2 p :064) beyond that explained by age (risk-years

Figure 1. Survival function for men’s age in years at ﬁrst birth
by hunter skill rating. SD p standard deviation.
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Table 3. Poisson regression best-reduced model for mens’
reproductive success
Covariate

Estimate

SE

z-value

P

(Intercept)
Risk years
Risk years2
Hunter wealth scale
No. of parents’ siblings
No. of full ﬁrst cousins

23.539
.185
2.002
.179
.318
2.112

.616
.033
.000
.043
.143
.333

25.741
5.679
24.503
4.168
2.221
23.361

.000***
.000***
.000***
.000***
.026**
.001***

Note. The x2 value for the model is 29.725; degrees of freedom (df ): 3,
P p 1.577e-06, McFadden Pseudo-R2 p 0.064 against a risk-years (years
since age 15 years) and risk-years2 null model; McFadden Pseudo-R2 p
0.408 against intercept-only null model. Z-test of signiﬁcance.
** P ! .01.
*** P ! .001.

shots in 2003, and their effects are likely downward-biased as
a result of measurement error. The fact that a signiﬁcant portion of the variance in male RS is explained with these wealth
measures points to signiﬁcant underlying effects. To the extent
that these forms of wealth are transmittable across generations,
signiﬁcant inequalities may be maintained.
Age at First Birth
In the best-reduced Cox regression of AFB, hunter material
wealth, wage labor (dummy), parents’ siblings, and full ﬁrst
cousins are signiﬁcant predictors of the hazard of having a
ﬁrst child (table 4). Hunter skill evaluations and occupational tier drop out of the regression. Hunter skill evaluations, hunter material wealth, and occupational tier are correlated but are not multicollinear (VIF collinearity statistics
for all three variables regressed on age-adjusted RS are ! 2).
The number of parents’ siblings and ﬁrst cousins also affect
age at ﬁrst birth, but in opposite directions, as in the male RS
results.
Variables representing hunters’ material and relational
wealth most strongly account for men’s RS inequality in this
analysis. Embodied wealth (hunting skill) appears to be an
important variable but falls out of both ﬁnal models. The
inﬂuence of participation in the competitive labor market on
men’s RS goes in the opposite direction as predicted. Wage
labor participation lowers AFB.

Discussion
Relational wealth measures are important predictors of male
RS in Ust’-Avam. Occupational tier individually predicts both
age-adjusted RS and age at ﬁrst birth but is not retained in
either best-reduced models. Occupational tier is correlated
with both hunting skill and hunter wealth scales. Of the remaining relational wealth measures, two kinship variables have
countervailing effects on men’s RS, providing only partial support for prediction 1: aunts and uncles have a positive effect on
men’s RS; and the number of full ﬁrst cousins lowers men’s RS

Volume 57, Number 2, April 2016

and AFB. This result corroborates ethnographic evidence of
allocare in the community (Ziker 2002; Ziker and Schnegg
2005). It appears that aunts and uncles provide allocare, but
this effect is reduced when they have children of their own.
This result may reﬂect the mixed effects of alloparental effort
on one hand and resource competition on the other.
We ﬁnd little evidence for human capital delays in Ust’Avam (prediction 2). Both wage-labor employment in the
community and education level individually reduced a man’s
time to ﬁrst birth, and wage-labor employment was retained
in the full Cox regression model. This may be due to the fact
that many men were educated during the Soviet period, when
the expectations of well-paying jobs were higher. We would
not necessarily expect this relationship between human capital and earlier AFB to hold in the future.
Consistent with prediction 3, hunter skill rating individually predicted men’s RS and AFB. However, this variable is
not retained in the ﬁnal models. Because the effect of hunter
skill rating is downward biased due to the imputation of missing ratings, this variable is likely to be more important than our
ﬁnal models indicate.
Material wealth has a positive effect on men’s reproduction, consistent with prediction 4. Survival analysis indicates
that men who scored higher on hunting wealth had their ﬁrst
child when they were younger. In addition, controlling for
age, men with greater hunting material wealth had more offspring than men with less hunting wealth in Poisson regressions. This variable is retained in both the Poisson and
Cox ﬁnal models. These two sets of ﬁndings provide evidence that variation in material wealth is associated with
men’s RS in this monogamous foraging/mixed-economy
community.

Proximate Mechanisms of Increased RS:
Interbirth Interval, Foraging Productivity,
and Producer Control
These ﬁndings are relevant to broader questions about the
mechanisms by which variation in embodied, material, and
relational wealth inﬂuences men’s RS. There has been much
debate in anthropology about the importance of men’s direct
provisioning of wives and children versus other possible beneﬁts for men’s hunting activities (Hawkes and Bliege Bird
2002; Hawkes et al. 2010; Hill and Gurven 2009, 2010; Wood
and Marlowe 2013). In Ust’-Avam, ethnographic observations and demographic data on men’s mating strategies are
not consistent with costly signaling. Young women leave
the village to pursue career opportunities in greater numbers
than men, resulting in a male-biased sex ratio (111∶100 in
2003 and 104∶100 in 2007) that reduces men’s mating opportunities. A recent study by Schacht and Borgerhoff Mulder
(2015) shows that, where adult sex ratio is male biased, indices
of within-pair commitment are also increased. Men may be
signaling to attract a ﬁrst spouse, but in a context where the
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Table 4. Backwards stepwise cox regression for men’s age at ﬁrst child’s birth
Covariates
Hunter wealth scale
Wage labor (dummy)
No. of parents’ siblings
No. of full ﬁrst cousins

No. of subjects

b

SE

Exp(b)

P

272
272
272
272

.155
.592
.233
2.065

.057
.213
.105
.030

1.168
1.808
1.262
.937

.002**
.004**
.015*
.017*

Note. Omnibus test 22 log likelihood p 1,054.038; x2 test p 19.478, degrees of freedom p 4; P ! .01. Robust
bootstrapped standard errors. P values determined by 2-tailed test.
* P ! .05.
** P ! .01.

population is highly monogamous, we can discount signaling
as a mechanism for attracting additional concurrent mates. In
fact, in Ust’-Avam, fewer men than women have children in
second marriages. In our sample of 272 men, 144 were unmarried, 115 had been married once, and only 13 (5% of all
men or 10% of ever-married men) were married a second
time. This remarriage rate is signiﬁcantly lower than that in
the United States.
If men are not are not leveraging their wealth to increase
their reproduction through multiple concurrent mates, then
what accounts for the relationship between wealth and fertility? To more closely examine the mechanisms producing
higher male RS, we compared the average interbirth intervals
(IBIs) of the wives of men in the sample (mean IBI 5 SD,
3:7  2:2, n p 81; ﬁg. 2). Student t-tests (one-tailed, independent samples) indicate that the wives of men with high hunter
skill rating and material wealth have signiﬁcantly shorter IBIs
than those men with lower skill rating and material wealth.
Although this is consistent with direct provisioning, we do not
have direct measures of women’s productivity and cannot address the alternative hypothesis that this effect on IBI is due to
positive marital assortment of better hunters and more productive women.
In addition, hunters show strong producer control. Of the
total amount of meat and ﬁsh available from the 77 hunts
documented in 2001 and 2003, the mean (5SD) proportion of the catch remaining with the hunter or his family is
45:4%  35:3%. The mean proportion (5SD) sold or bartered for supplies—usually with outsiders or the successor to
the government hunting enterprise—is 26%  39:0%, and
the amount given as voluntary transfers is 19%  23:7%.
These ﬁrst three kinds of distribution represent producer
control (Ziker 2006, 2007). The mean proportion (5SD)
given in exchange for other goods or services within the community is 5:2%  1:0%, and the mean amount requested of
the hunter is 4:3%  13:1%. Eleven of 36 hunters kept 100%
of the catch under their control. We did not ﬁnd that child
burden correlated with hunting effort in the sample of 77
hunts (tables A4, A5), suggesting that the correlation between
RS and hunting skill is not simply due to men with more
children hunting more.
In high-latitude ecologies, like those of Ust’-Avam, men
typically play a crucial role in the energetics of reproduction,

because gathering of plant foods is highly seasonal and
limited calorically (Kaplan et al. 2000). Men generate by far
the vast majority of the volume of locally procured food in
Ust’-Avam, and these foods have both caloric and cultural
signiﬁcance. We identify three effects of success at hunting
as measured by our wealth indices (hunter material wealth

Figure 2. Average interbirth interval (IBI) of men’s wives by
hunter skill rating (A) and hunter material wealth scale (B). The
t-test signiﬁcance is a P value of !.05, one-tailed, for hunter skill
and !.01, one-tailed, for material wealth.
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and hunter skill): earlier AFB establishing reproductive careers; shorter average IBI of wives; and greater RS. Participation in wage labor predicts earlier AFB but not the other
two effects. Thus, wage labor participation partly contradicts
expectations of embodied capital theory and partly conﬁrms
them. Considering the male-biased adult sex ratio and high
degrees of monogamy, it is likely that female choice of husband is strong in Ust’-Avam. Women’s choice likely considers
a variety of indicators of success. Hunting ability is the most
robust, but wage labor participants appear to be attractive at
least in terms of earlier AFB. The importance of hunting
skill and hunting material wealth is consistent with ethnographic observations of the development of hunters and female choice. Many young boys become involved in ﬁshing
and using snares, and community members are keen to discuss the interest and time boys spend in the tundra. People
pick up on men’s hunting skill early on, and not all descendants inherit primary rights to hunting territories. Hunters retain control of their catch, and they deliver it to their
wives (or parents) for processing and distribution. The wives
of better hunters are thus relatively well provisioned and, as
a result, have shorter IBIs, resulting in higher RS for themselves and their husbands. The relationship between hunting
success and RS in Ust’-Avam appears more consistent with
a female choice/provisioning model than a signaling-formates model.
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